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Dangote Cement: 
An African Success Story? 
 
Abstract 
This paper critiques the rise of Dangote Cement plc to become the dominant player in the 
Nigerian cement industry. Although the close relationship between the company’s 
founder, Aliko Dangote, and subsequent Nigerian governments has been an important 
factor in this success story, we argue that it is not the only explanatory variable. Dangote’s 
entrepreneurial skills and understanding of the Nigerian political and economic 
environment enabled him to proactively predict and exploit the rapid increase in demand 
for cement in the country. The reluctance of most multinational cement companies to 
increase their investments in Nigeria – a consequence of the ever increasing international 
scrutiny of business ethics especially in corruption prone countries – also helped reduce 
the competition and investment risks for Dangote Cement.  
 
Introduction 
Aliko Dangote, the founder of Dangote Cement, came to international attention in 2008 when, 
with an estimated fortune of $3.3 billion, Forbes magazine named him the richest person in 
Nigeria. By 2011, his net worth had risen to $13.8 billion, making him the richest person in 
Africa.
1
 In 2014, with a total net worth of US$ 25 billion, the equivalent to 5 percent of 
recently rebased Nigeria’s GDP, he became the twenty-third richest person in the world 
(Leadership, 4 March 2014). Dangote is now the richest black person ever (Fayemiwo and 
Neal 2013). Underpinning his personal wealth are investments in the Dangote Group of 
companies, which currently have interests spanning a range of industries, including: cement, 
sugar, salt, pasta, beverages, steel, fertilizer, oil and gas, Polypropylene products, haulage, and 
packaging.
2
 However, its main income earner and the major source of Dangote’s wealth is its 
cement business (The Economist, 12 April 2014). Dangote Cement, which is the biggest 
company quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, accounts for over 90 percent of Aliko 
Dangote’s personal wealth.3  
                                                          
1
 African Success, ‘Biography of Aliko Dangote’ (22 November 2011) downloaded from   
<http://www.africansuccess.org/visuFiche.php?id=469> (30 July 2014).  
 
2
 See Dangote, ‘Our Businesses’ (undated), downloaded from 
<http://dangote.com/ourbusinesses/ourbusinesses.aspx> (30 July 2014).  
 
3
 See Forbes, ‘Aliko Dangote is Africa’s first $20 Billion Man’, downloaded from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2013/06/01/aliko-dangote-is-africas-first-20-billion-man> (30 
July 2014).   
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The rise of the Dangote Group has been remarkable, on a continent where foreign businesses 
are the dominant players in the business landscape (Heilman and Lucas 1997; Elkan 1988). 
Founded in 1977 as a trading company, the group has gradually metamorphosed into a major 
manufacturing conglomerate in Africa. Its core business objective is “to provide local, value-
added products and services that meet the ‘basic needs’ of the populace through the 
construction and operation of large scale manufacturing facilities in Nigeria and across 
Africa.”4 The company has been very successful in terms of pursuing this objective, and has 
also embarked on an ambitious expansion into several other countries on the African 
continent.  
Given the above feat, Dangote has been variously described as the “quintessential Nigerian 
entrepreneur” and “a change engine for […] his continent.”5 Some, however, have questioned 
his strategy for achieving such enviable results. It has, for instance, been alleged that Dangote 
exploited his closeness to the Nigerian Government to gain undue business advantage. Along 
these lines, a leaked US government memo, dated 7 March 2005, asserted that the Dangote 
Group  “at one time or another held exclusive import rights in sugar, cement, and rice using 
such advantages to do volume business and undercut competitors.” The report went on to 
suggest that the “direction of GON [Government of Nigeria] trade barriers also suggests 
preferential treatment” and that high “tariffs or outright bans on imported items favor the 
Group in nearly all areas in which they do business including wheat flour, cement, certain 
textiles, sugar and pasta.”6 One of Dangote’s competitors in Nigeria, Ibeto Cement has openly 
accused Dangote of using his closeness to President Obasanjo to close the Ibeto Cement 
bagging factory two years ago (The Nation, 28 December 2012). A spokesperson for 
President Umaru YarÁdua, Obasanjo’s successor, confirmed in his autobiography that the 
Ibeto plant was “shut down by the Obasanjo government on grounds that were considered 
spurious” (Adeniyi 2001). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
4
 See  WorldStage Newsonline, ‘Dangote Cement to complete plants across Africa this year’ (12 January 2014), 
downloaded from http://www.m.worldstagegroup.com/readnews.php?&id=13084&active=news (3 August 
2014).  
5
  See  ‘Aliko Dangote: The quintessential Nigerian entrepreneur’ (20 May 2014), downloaded from  
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/05/aliko-dangote-quintessential-nigerian-entrepreneur/> (2 November 
2015). See also ‘Nigerian Billionaire Discusses Business Success’ (30 October 2015), downloaded from  
<http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2015/10/30/nigerian-billionaire-hbs-talk/> (2 November 2015). See also 
Olaore (2014).    
 
6
 ‘Aliko Dangote and why you should know about him’, downloaded from 
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05LAGOS362_a.html> on 28 May 2014.  
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Dangote’s relationship with subsequent Nigerian governments must, however, be 
contextualized. This is because such relationships are normally determined by the structure of 
business-government relations in diverse jurisdictions. In countries where state institutions are 
weak and corruption rampant, like Nigeria, such close relationships are not uncommon. In 
such jurisdictions, leaders routinely exploit the powers of their office for personal gains (cf. 
Ellis 2009; Yew 2000). This has elevated the temptation for businesses to court corrupt 
leaders in a bid to advance their interests. In Nigeria, the dynamics of state-business relations 
has been further complicated by the dominance of oil rents, which has made the government 
the major source of economic activity.
7
  
There have, however, been few studies on state-business relations in Africa (Sen and Te 
Velde 2009). This is partly because obtaining information about the corrupt practices of 
businesses and government officials is difficult. Such practices are usually conducted outside 
the law and thus are done secretly. This means that this kind of information is rarely captured 
in official reports. The public, however, sometimes gets an insight into the corrupt mechanics 
of such state-business relationships when there are disputes between competing business 
interests. Such public bickering usually plays out on the pages of the press, which explains the 
preponderance of newspaper sources in this article. Some of the other sources used in this 
study include companies’ financial reports and annual statements and published relevant 
autobiographies. Although the reliability of some of these sources, especially news reports, 
may sometimes be difficult to establish, it is important to stress that such stories were rarely 
denied by the parties involved; indeed, in some instances, such reports were even 
corroborated by other sources.    
This paper investigates the rapid rise of Dangote Cement that enabled it to emerge as the 
dominant player in cement manufacturing in Nigeria. Although Dangote Cement is a 
beneficiary of the complex state-business relations in Nigeria, this alone cannot fully explain 
the phenomenal success of the company. In addition to Aliko Dangote’s close association 
with government, his entrepreneurial skills have also played an important part in this success 
story. In this direction, we define an entrepreneur as “someone who exercises business 
judgement in the face of uncertainty” (Bull and Willard 1993). This involves strategic 
planning and risk taking (cf.: Nijkamp 2003; Shimizu 2012; Luchsinger and Bagby 1987). It 
                                                          
 
7
 For a critical analysis of the negative impact of oil on Nigeria’s economy, please see (Khan 1994 and 
Olayiwola 1987). 
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is therefore more than simply starting or inheriting a business; it is a process through which 
individuals identify opportunities, allocate resources, and create value. Entrepreneurial 
success is thus “simply a function of the ability of an entrepreneur to see these opportunities 
in the marketplace, initiate change (or take advantage of change) and create value through 
solutions” (cf. Foriwaa and Akuamoah-Boateng 2013).  
Specifically, this paper argues that the success of Dangote Cement was greatly assisted by the 
ability of Dangote to understand the dynamics of the Nigerian business and political 
environment. This aided the timing of his investment decision that enabled Dangote Cement 
to transform from a cement importer to a cement manufacturer in Nigeria. Entwined with the 
above entrepreneurial factor is the rapid rise in the demand for cement in Nigeria. Between 
2000 and 2014, demand increased by over 400 percent, from 5.62 million metric tonnes to 23 
million metric tonnes (see Table 1). Dangote exploited this demand to rapidly increase its 
domestic cement production capacity in Nigeria from 900,000 metric tonnes per annum in 
2000, when it acquired controlling interests in the Benue Cement Company (Dangote Cement 
and Benue Cement 2010:12) to the current 28.2 million metric tonnes (Table 2). 
To achieve the objective of this paper, we first discuss the concept of state-business relations 
and then go on to critique the history of the cement industry in Nigeria and the emergence of 
Dangote Cement as a major trading company. Next, we critique the cement industry’s 
Backward Integration Policy (BIP) in Nigeria and its impact on the transformation of Dangote 
Cement from a trading entity to the dominant cement manufacturing company in Nigeria. We 
conclude that Dangote Cement is an African success story that is best explained by a range of 
factors, which include the close relationship of Aliko Dangote with the Nigerian state, his 
entrepreneurship and the over 400 percent increase in the demand for cement in Nigeria since 
the return of the country to civil rule in 1999. 
State-Business Relations   
In most parts of the world, states and businesses are important actors in promoting economic 
development (Brautigam et al. 2002). It is this shared responsibility that creates the need for 
them to engage with each other. It is, for instance, the duty of the state to create a system for 
formulating and operationalizing regulations that are designed to promote economic 
development and address disputes arising from the activities of diverse economic actors 
within nation states (Harriss 2006). The effectiveness of the institutions created is greatly 
enhanced by the clarity and reliability of the processes the state uses to formulate policies as 
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well as their acceptance by businesses. Trust between business and the state can help 
“generate industrial transformation by improving information flows and over the longer term, 
establishing credibility and trust on both sides” (Maxfield and Schneider 1997).  
 
Although cooperation between the state and businesses is desired, attaining it is not always 
easy. This is because of the multiplicity of interests among business actors (Schneider 2004). 
Given the potential economic and business consequences of the structure of the emergent 
institutions that formulate and operationalize business regulations, the entire process of 
agreeing on an acceptable state-business relationship framework is often contested (Whitfield 
and Buur 2014). The outcome of such contests, and the nature of the emergent institutions, 
are, however, generally determined by country-specific dynamics (North et al. 2009). The 
outcome usually reflects the way in which power in different countries is shared amongst 
different agents, elites, and coalitions of interest. Such outcomes can manifest in both formal 
and informal institutional arrangements between states and businesses (Te Velde 2010).  
 
Irrespective of the outcome, state-business relationships are generally more effective when 
they are institutionalized (Cali and Sen 2011). A positive consequence of establishing strong 
institutions and enforceable rules is that it reduces the risk of unexpected changes in 
business rules. This generally means that there are clearly defined, reliable, and transparent 
ways in which policies are made, disputes settled and rules enforced. The existence of 
strong institutions therefore the reduce transaction costs associated with operating 
businesses in such jurisdictions (Gray and Khan 2010). It also reduces uncertainty and 
allows businesses to confidently adopt long-term growth strategies. Such conditions are, 
therefore, conducive for economic development. This is because policy uncertainty acts as a 
hefty tax on investments (Rodrik 1991).  
The scenario is, however, different in nation states where patronage networks are powerful 
and extensive. Such networks help build close links between politicians and businesses (Singh 
and Zammit 2006). This results in the emergence of a web of reciprocal interdependent 
relationships and makes it difficult to separate state actors from business interests (Pasong and 
Lebel 2000). The consequence of a concentration of patronage-inspired business and political 
interests is that any governance systems that emerge usually lack the institutional capacity and 
political willingness to enforce state regulations (Dauvergne 1994). 
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In developing countries, which typically have weak institutions, corruption and cronyism 
often emerge as important drivers of the relationship between government officials and 
businesses. In the absence of strong institutions, personal relationships play an important role 
in deciding how government policies are designed and implemented. Under such 
circumstances, loyalty, bribery, nepotism, and tribalism become potential sources of 
influence. This type of scenario has been christened crony capitalism.
8
 In such jurisdictions, 
“access to the state apparatus remains the major avenue to private accumulation, and the quest 
for ‘rent seeking’ opportunities continues to bring a stampede of favored elites and would-be 
favored elites to the gates of the presidential palace” (Hutchroft 1991). Under the above 
scenario, investment outcomes become uncertain, complicating decision making (Utomi 
1998). Prudence therefore encourages economic actors to concentrate on economic activities 
that guarantee short-term returns.  
This explains why state-business literature in developing countries has historically been 
dominated by the view that the existence of market restrictions and other sources of ‘rents’ or 
politically created incomes, and the absence of strong institutions are injurious to economic 
development (Gray and Khan 2010). However, this theory has not always been supported by 
historical fact. A comparative study of Nigeria and Indonesia – two countries with similar 
social characteristics – clearly reveals this divergence (Pinto 1987). Both countries are big and 
populous, and have a history of military government. Both countries are also oil producers 
and have high levels of corruption. Despite the above similarities, the economic development 
gap between both countries have continued to widen.  In 1965, for instance, Indonesia’s per 
capita income was lower than that of Nigeria. By the year 2000, however, Indonesia’s per 
capita income was five times that of Nigeria. While Indonesia has, to a great extent, 
diversified its exports away from oil, the Nigerian economy is still heavily dependent on the 
commodity (The Economist, 13 January 2000).  
It has been argued that the above difference between Nigeria and Indonesia “highlights the 
importance of developmental leadership in shifting the equilibrium of developing economies 
towards productive accumulation.” Also, the “stability of Soeharto’s regime and his relatively 
consistent commitments to growth reveal a marked contrast to the sporadic tenure of Nigerian 
                                                          
8
 “Crony capitalism is an economic system in which the adjudication of commercial disputes as well as the 
allocation of resources are generally made to favour those who have a close relationship with political leaders or 
government officials (by blood or by bribes). It is a system in which connection trumps competence, and money 
supersedes merit” (Wei 2001).   
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leaders and their strategies of clientelism, distributional politics, and economic predation” 
(Lewis 2007).
9
  
From the above comparison, it is clear that, under certain conditions, crony capitalism can 
indeed promote economic growth. This has been explained thus:  
Although money politics – corruption and cronyism – is generally seen as inhibiting 
economic growth, there are certain conditions in which it can actually be beneficial. 
Developing countries typically have weak institutional structures. In that case, if there is a 
balance of power among a small and stable set of government and business elites, money 
politics can actually reduce transaction costs and make long term agreements and 
investments more efficient , even while enriching those fortunate few who collude 
together (Kang 2002: 3).
10
 
In sum, political stability is an important ingredient for the emergence of suitable conditions 
for crony capitalism to enhance economic growth. It has, however, been pointed out that this, 
alone, is not a sufficient condition for crony capitalism to result in economic growth and 
development. The disposition of the ruling class is also an important variable. In general, 
ruling elites pursue the easiest avenues for generating resources. A major factor that can 
impact on this attitude is if there is a threat to their continued stay in power. Under such 
circumstances, ruling elites can use their close relationships with business to pursue economic 
development (Whitfield and Therkildsen 2011). Businesses are, however, reluctant to 
undertake long term ventures when there is political instability (Schneider and Frey 1985). 
 
In Nigeria, the class of African business elites was greatly boosted when the government of 
General Yakubu Gowon, encouraged by the country’s emergent oil wealth, embarked on the 
indigenization policy in 1972 (Rood 1976). This indigenization exercise resulted in either 
the forced takeover or shared ownership of several foreign businesses by Nigerians. In 1977, 
the Nigerian Government, then under the leadership of General Olusegun Obasanjo further 
expanded the scope of businesses requiring mandatory participation of Nigerians as part- or 
sole owners (Uche 2012). Given that Nigerian bureaucrats and senior military personnel 
became some of the major beneficiaries of the indigenization policies, it can rightly be said 
that the adoption of the policy was a major landmark in the development of crony capitalism 
in Nigeria (Forrest 1994). Indigenization simply encouraged “a comprador role [acting as 
                                                          
 
9
 See also Akinyoade (2012).  
 
10
 See also Kang (2003).   
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fronts for foreign interests] for local business in a society already plagued by strong 
comprador tendencies” (Biersteker 1983). This government policy therefore enabled the 
emerging class of African business elites to amass unproductive capital. Political stability, 
however, continued to elude the country.  
Although General Obasanjo handed over power to the democratically elected government of 
Shehu Shagari in 1979, corruption remained widespread (Ekwe-Ekwe 1985).  Politically, 
the country also remained unstable. Shagari was overthrown in December 1983 by General 
Mohammadu Buhari, who, in turn, was overthrown in August 1985 by General Ibrahim 
Babangida. Subsequently, economic downturn and growing corruption ignited widespread 
protests against the Babangida military regime (Lewis 1996).  
After annulling the presidential elections of 12 June 1993, widespread protests forced 
Babangida to step aside. Mr. Ernest Shonekan was installed as interim president of the 
country in August 1993. After three months, Shonekan was overthrown by General Sani 
Abacha. The Abacha dictatorship further aggravated the already charged political 
environment. This was, in part, because of increasing international pressure to stamp out 
such dictatorships at the time (Makinda 1996).  
Abacha tried to manoeuvre the above forces by putting in place a democratic process that 
would have seen him transform from a military dictator into a civilian president. When he 
suddenly died before achieving his objective, he was replaced by General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar. Given the widespread opposition to the Abacha regime, “no option was left for 
his successor but to quietly organize a respectable hand-over of power to civilians” (Njoku 
2001). In May 1999, General Abubakar handed over power to the democratically elected 
President Olusegun Obasanjo. Throughout this period, Dangote was a silent but important 
recurrent decimal in the corridors of power in the aforementioned governments, and his 
name came up in various business deals.  
The election of Obasanjo as president marked the beginning of an era of political stability in 
the country. This satisfied an important condition for crony capitalism to create a suitable 
environment for long-term investments and economic growth. The need for political leaders 
to routinely seek the mandate of the people in order to remain in power also encourages 
those in power to undertake policies that improve the welfare of their people (Boix and 
Posner 1998).  
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Western multinationals operating in corruption prone jurisdictions have been reluctant to 
exploit these changes, mainly because of increasing regulations, especially in their home 
countries, against unethical business practices abroad. Although local businesses do not face 
such repercussions, most of them have also been unable to exploit the opportunities created by 
the aforementioned political changes. This was because they lacked entrepreneurial skills 
(Nafziger 1990). Aliko Dangote, however, is an exception. As will be seen in the next section, 
the reluctance of multinational cement companies to undertake the huge investments required 
to establish cement manufacturing plants in Nigeria date back to the colonial era.  
History of the Nigerian Cement Industry 
Cementitious building materials were introduced in Nigeria with the imposition of colonial 
rule, and the consequent need to establish administrative and developmental infrastructure. 
From the beginning, the whole idea of colonial rule was promoted by British commercial 
interests in Nigeria (Cain and Hopkins 1980). Thus, it was not surprising that, from the 
outset, the cement trade in Nigeria was dominated by British entrepreneurs. Specifically, a 
number of British cement traders –mainly agents of the Associated Portland Cement 
Manufacturers (APCM), the British cement multinational that, at the time, was the largest 
cement company in the world – constituted themselves into a syndicate, the Cement 
Marketing Company Limited, and took control of the cement importation business in West 
Africa. With the increasing demand for cement in Nigeria, Lord Lugard, the Governor-
General, proposed the introduction of cement manufacturing in Nigeria in 1919. He argued 
that the importance of cement in capital projects, its high bulk and low value, made it an 
obvious choice as a pioneer industry (Hay 1971).
11
  
Despite Lord Lugard’s recommendation, the syndicate that dominated the importation and 
supply of cement in Nigeria did not consider the establishment of a local plant to be viable 
at the time. In 1926, for instance, it decided against the construction of a 25,000 tons cement 
factory near Makurdi and in Nkalagu, near Enugu, on the grounds that the high cost of 
electricity, which is crucial to cement manufacturing, would make such factories 
uncompetitive when compared to the cost of importing cement from the UK.
12
   
                                                          
11
 See also Kilby (1969).  
 
12
 See General Report Upon the Proposal to Manufacture Portland Cement in Nigeria prepared for the Nigerian 
Portland Cement Syndicate Limited London dated 9 August 1926 (BNA CO 583/ 150/ 3).  
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The Cement Marketing Company Limited, however, exploited its close relationship with the 
colonial government to push for the imposition of higher import tariffs on non-UK 
companies that tried to supply cement to Nigeria in order to protect British manufacturing 
interests.
13
 At the time, Germany, Belgium, Poland, Japan, and Italy were able to export 
cement to Nigeria at prices that were more competitive than cement imported by the British 
Syndicate.
14
 Although the colonial government was able to impose discriminatory tariffs on 
Japanese cement imports into Nigeria in June 1934, it was unable to do the same for cement 
imported from other European countries. This was because the UK had bilateral agreements 
with several European countries that precluded it from imposing such discriminatory 
tariffs.
15
 Despite its market disadvantages, the British syndicate was able to maintain its 
dominance of the Nigerian market arguably because of its superior distribution network and 
marketing strategy. The company, for instance, had signed an agreement with its main 
distributors not to distribute cement from any other country in Nigeria.
16
  
In 1942, Lord Swinton, who was then the Resident Minister in West Africa, also expressed 
concern about the continued importation of cement into Nigeria, arguing that a “cargo of 
cement sunk can hold up vital defence works and service accommodation; and again we 
should save shipping space both from England and coast-wise.”17 Subsequently, in 1950, the 
federal government invited APCM, to establish a local cement production plant in the 
country. The company, however, declined the invitation, because “there was a certain 
natural disposition to supply Nigeria from APCM’s efficient well written down home 
plants” (Kilby 1975: 504). Despite this, cement demand and its importation into Nigeria 
continued to grow, rising from 153,861 tons in 1950 to 297,436 tons in 1953 (Kilby 
1969:101).   
                                                          
 
13
  See Cement Marketing Company Limited to Sir Cecil Bottomley (Colonial Office), letter dated 26 January 
1932 (BNA CO 554/ 89/ 18) and Governor of Nigeria to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Letter dated 15 
March 1932 (BNA CO 554/ 89/ 18).   
 
 
14
 See Governor of Nigeria to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Letter dated 15 March 1932 (BNA CO 554/ 
89/ 18).   
 
15
 See Undated Cement Marketing Company Limited Memo titled: Preferential Tariffs in Nigeria and the Gold 
Coast (BNA CO 852/ 159/ 3).   
 
16
 See Undated Cement Marketing Company Limited Memo titled: Preferential Tariffs in Nigeria and the Gold 
Coast (BNA CO 852/ 159/ 3).   
 
17
 See Extract from letter to Brigadier Bishop from Lord Swinton dated 31 July 1942 (BNA CO 852/371/6).  
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Unable to find willing investors, the federal government decided to become the major investor 
in the project. The Danish firm of S. L. Smidth and its British associate, the Tunnel Portland 
Cement Company, which acted as consulting engineer and managing agents, respectively, 
agreed to take up a small portion of the equity capital (Ugoh 1964: 73). The Nigerian Cement 
Company (NCC), which was based in Nkalagu, Eastern Nigeria, subsequently commenced 
operation in 1957 with a production capacity of 120,000 metric tons. Soon after the 
establishment of NCC, APCM realized that its conservative approach towards investing in the 
Nigerian cement industry could result in a loss of market share. This spurred the company to 
facilitate the establishment of the West African Portland Cement Company Limited 
(WAPCO) in Ewekoro, where it held a controlling share (51 percent) in 1960. Despite the 
establishment of a second plant in the country, cement importation in Nigeria continued to 
increase, with the country importing 626,000 metric tons of cement in 1960 (Mojekwu et al. 
2012).  
Other regions subsequently established their own cement companies, arguably because of the 
increasing demand for cement and the abundance of its major raw material – limestone – 
across all the regions of the country (see Ola 1977). In 1964, for instance, the Mid Western 
Region established the Bendel Cement Company in Ukpilla with a capacity of 150,000 metric 
tons, and in 1965, the Government of the Eastern Region established a second cement plant in 
Calabar with a capacity of 100,000 metric tons. In 1967, the Government of the Northern 
Region established the Cement Company of Northern Nigeria in Sokoto with a production 
capacity of 100,000 metric tons. (Makoju 2010).   
The demand for cement continued to grow and was further aided by the Nigerian Civil War 
(1967-1970) and the postwar oil boom. The result was that the federal government engaged in 
massive importation of cement in its bid to reconstruct the war-torn country and improve 
living conditions for its citizens. However, corruption and sheer incompetence ensured that 
the entire cement importation process was abused extensively. Arguably, the most scandalous 
incident was the Ministry of Defence awarding a contract to import 16.2 million metric tons 
of cement between December 1974 and June 1975 into the Lagos Port, which had the capacity 
to handle less than 5 million metric tons of goods a year (See Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1976; Forrest 1992). The demand for cement was further boosted by the massive construction 
commissioned by the Nigerian Government as part of its preparation to host the Second 
World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in 1977 (cf. Kulla 1976). 
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One direct consequence of the increased local demand for cement in Nigeria was the 
establishment of additional cement factories in the country. In 1978, for instance, APCM 
(UK) established its second Nigeria cement plant, WAPCO in Shagamu, with a production 
capacity of  900,000 metric tons. This was the same year that APCM changed its name to 
Blue Circle (UK). In 1979, Ashaka Cement, with a production capacity of 700,000 metric 
tons, was established in Gombe.
18
 In 1980, the Benue Cement Company, with a capacity of 
900,000 metric tons, commenced operations. The Federal Government of Nigeria was the 
core investor in this company (cf. Scheme of Merger 2010).   
 
The investment climate of the 1970s was very different to that of the 1950s and 1960s, during 
the era of the first generation of cement production plants in . By the time these new cement 
companies were established, it was not possible for foreign business interests to own majority 
shares in Nigerian cement companies. This was because both the 1972 and 1977 
indigenization decrees foreclosed possible foreign domination of the cement manufacturing 
companies in Nigeria by including cement production in the category of businesses that must 
be controlled by Nigerians. The consequence of this was that, aside from having controlling 
interests in Ashaka, BCC, and WAPCO Shagamu cement companies, the Nigerian 
Government also acquired a controlling interest in WAPCO Ewekoro, which had been 
established earlier by APCM.
19
 
 
By 1979, when Shehu Shagari became president, the Nigerian economy had started to 
weaken. Dwindling oil revenues signalled an end to the oil boom era (cf. Brautigam 1997). 
The Shagari Government, desperate to attract foreign investments, began to relax the 
provisions of the indigenization decree. In 1981, for instance, the government transferred 
investments in cement production from the schedule requiring Nigeria control to that 
permitting foreign control (Onwuka 1992). Despite the above policy shift, the government 
was unable to attract long-term foreign capital into the Nigerian cement industry. This was 
arguably because the indigenization experience of the 1970s, coupled with the near absence of 
political stability, provided multinational businesses little incentive to undertake long-term 
                                                          
18
 “The company was promoted by the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank Limited in partnership with the 
Federal Ministry of Industries, Blue Circle Industries plc UK […] [which was acquired in 2001 by LAFARGE 
SA France], the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry, Northern Nigeria Investment Limited and the 
Government of the then North-Eastern State (now Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe States).” 
See Ashaka Cement Annual Report (2012).  
 
19
 For a critique of the indigenization decrees of 1972 and 1977, please see Uche (2012) and Belveridge (1991).  
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capital intensive projects. The result was that between 1980 and 2000, no new cement 
company was established in Nigeria (Mojekwu et al. 2012). As will be seen in the next 
section, Dangote Cement exploited its close relationship with government to become a major 
beneficiary of the rapid increase in cement imports during the said period.  
 
Dangote and Cement Trading in Nigeria 
 
Aliko Dangote, the founder of Dangote Cement, came from a business family that clearly 
understood the importance of state-government relations in business development in Nigeria. 
Coincidentally, he was born in 1957, the year NCC, the first cement production company in 
Nigeria, commenced operations. His father, Mohammed Dangote was a business associate of 
Alhassan Dantata, who was the richest African during the colonial era (Forrest 1994). His 
mother, Mariya Sanusi Dantata, was the eldest daughter of one of Alhassan Dantata’s sons, 
Sanusi Dantata, a major groundnut merchant in Kano. As a child, Aliko showed keen interest 
in entrepreneurship. As a primary school student he sold candies for profit (Anyansi-
Archibong and Anyansi 2014). As he watched his grandfather’s “nattering style with 
politicians, military generals, and the wheeler-dealers in the nation’s inner power circle,” 
Dangote quickly learnt that in Nigeria, “politics and business are closely related” (Fayemiwo 
and Neal 2013).  
 
Dangote began his career working as a store manager for his maternal grandfather. In 1976, 
he established his own business, specializing in cement and commodity trading. This was 
done with a loan of N500,000 from his maternal grandfather. This business venture proved to 
be extremely profitable, making it possible for him to pay back the loan within three months 
(Ogbor 2009). In 1977, he moved to Lagos, where he continued his rapidly-growing trading 
business. By the early 1980s, Dangote had become the largest importer of sugar in Nigeria 
(Forrest 1994). Over the years, Dangote ventured into manufacturing, services, and trade in 
diverse industries, including banking, oil and gas, textile, fish, salt, wheat flour, sugar, 
pasta, calico, cashew nuts, gum Arabic, ginnery, cotton, fruit juices, and bottled water.  
 
Dangote’s forays into the above industries were essentially shaped by the erratic nature of 
Nigerian Government policies in the past. In the early 1980s, for instance, as a consequence 
of declining oil revenues, the government of Shehu Shagari introduced austerity measures. In 
 16 
 
order to preserve its limited foreign exchange, an import licensing mechanism was put in 
place. Dangote’s “family already had government connections, so he was able to secure the 
appropriate licenses quickly – a step that can often derail new ventures in Nigeria.”20 This 
enabled Dangote to be a key player in the importation of cement and other essential 
commodities like rice, flour, and sugar during the Shagari era.
21
 In December 1983, Shagari 
was overthrown by General Muhammadu Buhari. The new regime turned its focus to import 
substitution and exports. Dangote quickly realigned his business strategy and began to 
manufacture and/or export products like calico, cashew nuts, gum arabic, textiles, ginnery and 
cotton (Fayemiwo and Neal 2013: 211). The administration, however, was short-lived, and 
after only 20 months Buhari was overthrown by General Babangida in August 1985.  
 
Continued deterioration of the Nigerian economy forced the Babangida administration to 
adopt the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986. One of the main objectives of 
SAP was to reduce government interference in the economy. With its unhealthy balance of 
payments situation, the Nigerian Government was simply no longer in a position to continue 
playing an active role in the management of government-owned industries. This was 
especially so given the fact that most of these industries were poorly managed and were thus 
making losses that the government had to absorb. It was in the spirit of reducing wastages that 
the Babangida government  promulgated the Privatization and Commercialization Decree No. 
25 of 1988, to guide the planned commercialization and privatization exercise for 
government-controlled businesses. The Technical Committee on Privatization and 
Commercialization that was subsequently established, identified 92 enterprises for 
privatization; however, none of these companies was privatized before the Babangida 
administration came to an abrupt end in August 1993.
22
 The subsequent administration of 
General Sani Abacha did little to advance the privatization process. His administration’s 
policies were, though, favourable to Dangote’s trading interests. In December 1996, for 
instance, “Abacha ordered Dangote to flood the nation’s markets with rice and he imported so 
                                                          
20
 Celebrity Networth, ‘How Aliko Dangote Became The Richest Black Man on the Planet and Africa’s Secret 
Weapon’ (27 March 2014), downloaded from http://www.celebritynetworth.com/articles/entertainment-
articles/aliko-dangote-became-africas-secret-weapon-richest-black-man-planet/> (4 November 2014).   
 
21
 ‘Aliko Dangote, Richest Black in the World’, (5 May 2013), downloaded from 
<http://www.abiyamo.com/aliko-dangote-richest-black-in-the-world/9/> (31 July 2014).   
 
22
 For a critique of the privatization programme please see Ugorji (1995).  
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much that the price of rice collapsed by almost 80%!”23 Although Dangote was making 
money from the importation of cement and other essential commodities, he never lost sight of 
the fact that, given the population of the country and the abundance of natural resources, 
localizing the production of some of the imported commodities could be more profitable for 
the company and also more beneficial to the Nigerian Government.
24
  
 
Local production of cement is capital intensive (Pan African Capital Research plc, 2011). 
Historically, multinational companies have always been cautious about investing such huge 
sums of money in local production (Ugoh 1966). Such a strategy was influenced by the 
perceived political risks of undertaking such investments in Africa at the time. As already 
mentioned, the indigenization of foreign businesses in the 1970s did little to encourage their 
enthusiasm in this direction. Although the indigenization policies were effectively reversed by 
the Shagari administration, multinational companies still trod with caution when it came to 
establishing new cement plants. Despite this, cement demand in the country continued to 
increase. The result was the importation of more cement into the country. In 1990, for 
instance, 23 percent of the 3.9 million metric tons of cement consumed in the country was 
imported, while by 2000, 59.3 percent of the 5.6 million metric tons of cement consumed in 
the country was imported.
25
   
 
It was this increased importation of cement that prompted companies to begin importing bulk 
cement in silos and then bagging such cement locally. This ensured that at least part of the 
cement production process took place in Nigeria. The result was that, at the peak of its bulk 
cement importation, Nigeria hosted sixteen terminals for the importation and bagging of 
cement. Because the indigenization policy had been reversed at the time, the field for this 
short-term, quick turnover investment was open to both local and foreign cement companies. 
Although foreign cement companies like Lafarge also operated in this market, Dangote 
Cement was the dominant player. Specifically, Dangote was able to establish five cement 
terminals for the importation and bagging of bulk cement. With his close links with 
government, Dangote was able to get concessions that were not ordinarily available to other 
                                                          
23
 ‘Aliko Dangote, Richest Black in the World’, (May 5 2013), downloaded from 
<http://www.abiyamo.com/aliko-dangote-richest-black-in-the-world/9/> (31 July 2014).   
 
24
 See  WorldStage Newsonline, ‘Dangote Cement to complete plants across Africa this year’ (12 January 2014), 
downloaded from http://www.m.worldstagegroup.com/readnews.php?&id=13084&active=news (3 August 
2014).  
25
 See Table 1.  
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cement bagging companies in Nigeria. According to a leaked US Government report, it was 
such contacts that made it possible for the company to construct “its own berth at GON-
owned Apapa port in Lagos where ships with production inputs offload directly at the 
Dangote Group factory.”26 At its peak, Dangote controlled  46 percent of the bulk cement 
market in Nigeria (Ohimain 2014).  
Dangote’s cement industry dream, however, went beyond being the largest importer of 
cement in Nigeria. As already mentioned, it was clear to Dangote that localizing cement 
production in Nigeria would be an extremely rewarding venture for both his company and the 
Nigerian Government. Given the long-term nature of such investments, political stability 
became a very important entrepreneurial risk factor.
27
 As will be seen in the next section, 
Dangote’s massive investments in local cement production commenced after General 
Obasanjo was elected as civilian President of Nigeria in 1999. Given the political struggle that 
led to Nigeria’s transition to democratic rule and the growing anti-military government 
sentiments at the time, it was clear that the risk of sudden change in government in the 
country had been greatly reduced. It was this improved political stability that enabled Dangote 
to undertake huge investments in cement production in Nigeria. Given his closeness to the 
Nigerian rulers, it was not surprising that this decision coincided with the promulgation of a 
Backward Integration Policy for the industry by the Obasanjo Administration. As will be seen 
below, Dangote’s foray into cement production was greatly assisted by the enormous rent 
capital he accumulated from his dominant role in cement importation in the country. This was 
no doubt aided by the fact that “cement prices in Africa are still the highest in the world, 
averaging around 200 percent higher than any other region” (White 2015).    
Backward Integration Policy and Cement Manufacturing in Nigeria   
The adoption of the Backward Integration Policy (BIP) for the Nigerian cement industry had 
its origins in the election of General Olusegun Obasanjo as the Nigerian President in 1999. 
The essence of the BIP was to make Nigeria self-sufficient in cement production by 
encouraging the development of local production capacity and discouraging the importation 
of cement into the country.  Indigenous cement manufacturing, however, requires substantial 
                                                          
26
 Downloaded from: <https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05LAGOS362_a.html> on 28 May 2014. 
 
27
 According to the Nigeria Industrial Revolution Plan,  “History shows that no country has ever become rich by 
exporting raw materials without also having an industrial sector, and in modern terms an advanced services 
sector. The more a country specializes in the production of raw materials only, the poorer it becomes […] 
Industry multiplies National wealth” (2014, p.2). 
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long-term capital outlay. It is therefore risky from a financial standpoint, especially in a 
country with a history of political instability. Although the 1999 transition to civil rule 
reduced the political risks associated with such long term investments, it did not alter the 
nature of state-business relations in Nigeria. This created an enabling environment for 
Dangote Cement to switch from bulk cement importation and bagging to cement 
manufacturing in Nigeria. Before embarking on this potentially profitable transition, Dangote 
obtained assurances from the Nigerian Government. According to The Economist magazine:  
Mr Dangote’s move into cement-making came after a conversation with the country’s then 
president, Olusegun Obasanjo, who wondered why his country could only import it. A 
subsequent ban on foreign firms importing cement unless they also set up plants in Nigeria 
encouraged Dangote itself to go into production. So did the prospect of a complete import 
ban once the country was self-sufficient. Cement is a cheap, bulky product. Plants 
typically need to be near both limestone and customers if they are to make money. So 
there is a logic to making it in Nigeria, a big market with the raw materials at hand. That 
said, the business would doubtless be less profitable if imports were unrestricted. 
Dangote’s margins in Nigeria are 63%, compared with the 30-40% margins typical in 
other “frontier” markets…. Dangote’s top brass argue that without the import ban, no one 
would make the sort of long-term investment required to build a cement industry (April  
12 2014).  
 
The first step that the Obasanjo administration took in its bid to promote local production of 
cement in Nigeria was to complete the privatization of all the government-controlled cement 
plants that had been conceptualized under the Babangida administration. Poor management 
ensured that such plants had either been abandoned or were producing at very low capacity 
(Makoju 2010). It was during the regime of President Obasanjo that the government sold its 
shares in all cement companies in Nigeria. Of all the cement companies privatized, the 
Dangote Group was able to acquire controlling interest in only one: Benue Cement Company. 
Information on the Dangote Group website makes it explicit that the company acquired a 
65.96% stake in the Benue Cement Company “as part of the group’s strategic decision to 
move from cement importation to local production.” Although it is widely believed that 
Obasanjo facilitated this purchase, it is fair to point out that the Dangote Group was not the 
only beneficiary of the government decision to dispose of its interests in cement companies in 
Nigeria.  
Specifically, the reversal of the indigenization policy made it possible for multinational 
cement companies like Blue Circle (UK) to acquire a controlling interest in WAMCO 
(Ewekoro and Shagamu) where they were pioneer investors.  The same Blue Circle, which 
was later bought by and became part of Lafarge SA, also used the opportunity to acquire 
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controlling shares in Ashaka Cement. Some regional and state governments also sold their 
interests in cement companies at the time. This enabled Scancem International (ANS) of 
Norway (now part of the Heidelberg group), to become the core investor in the Cement 
Company of Northern Nigeria (Weekly Trust, 11 August 2000) and Bendel Cement Company 
in Ukpilla Edo State (Mobbs 2004). Heidelberg Cement, however, decided to exit the 
Nigerian market in 2008 because it wanted to focus its “financial resources on markets in 
which it can achieve a leading market position and which have an appropriate opportunity/risk 
ratio” (Heidelberg Cement Annual Report 2008). By the end of all the consolidations in the 
cement industry, which followed the Obasanjo’s privatization of cement companies, Lafarge 
SA had confirmed its position as the dominant player in the cement manufacturing industry in 
the country.
28
  
The second step taken by the Obasanjo administration in its bid to promote local cement 
production in the country was to formally adopt a Backward Integration Policy (BIP) for the 
industry in 2002. The said policy specified that cement import licences be allocated only to 
importers who show proof of building factories for local cement manufacturing in Nigeria. 
As further support for local manufacturing of cement, the policy also provided for the 
waiver of VAT and custom duty for importation of cement production equipment (Ohimain 
2014). New investments in cement manufacturing also qualify for tax exemption for up to 
seven years under the Pioneer Industry Scheme (Fowowe 2013). 
It is widely believed that the above policies have been shaped and sustained by Dangote’s 
generous contributions to Nigerian leaders. Dangote, for instance, was one of the major 
funders of Obasanjo’s 1999 Presidential campaign (cf. Iliffe 2011). He also contributed 
handsomely towards Obasanjo’s re-election in 2003 and towards the construction of 
Obasanjo’s Presidential Library. He also donated  cement worth N3 billion for the 
construction of the head office of Obasanjo’s political party, the People’s Democratic Party. 
Since the exit of Obasanjo, Dangote has remained consistent in his generosity to the political 
class. Dangote has publicly defended his closeness to most governments in Nigeria on the 
grounds that if you want to do business “you have to foster a good relationship with the 
Government of the day. If you don’t, how do you expect the government to listen to your 
                                                          
28 “Our total installed capacity in 2002 represented approximately 46% of the total rated capacity in Nigeria […]. 
In 2003, Nigeria contributed approximately 32.9% of our cement sales in Sub-Saharan Africa and Indian Ocean” 
(Lafarge Annual Report 2003, p.33).   
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complaints?” (The Economist 23 June 2012). The company has also argued that indigenous 
industrial development is impossible in a developing country without some form of 
government support (The Economist 12 April 2014).
29
  
To consolidate his position in the cement industry, Dangote rapidly expanded his cement 
manufacturing interests in Nigeria by building the Obajana Cement factory. The enormous 
rent Dangote accumulated from his very profitable cement importation business helped him 
actualize this capital intensive venture. The International Finance Corporation, for instance, 
noted that under the first phase of the Obajana Cement project, which cost $800 million, 
Dangote provided 40 percent of the total cost ($320 million) as “sponsors’ equity.”30 Obajana 
Cement currently has a production capacity of 13.2 million metric tonnes per annum. In 
December 2011, Dangote Cement commissioned its third factory in Ibese Ogun State. The 
factory now has a production capacity of 12 million metric tonnes per year.
31
 
There is little doubt that the move by Dangote from bulk cement importation to cement 
production was a very profitable entrepreneurial move. In 2009, for instance, the average 
production cost, as a percentage of sales revenue, of Dangote’s bulk cement import 
terminals was 85 percent while that for his cement production plants in Obajana and Benue 
were 26 percent and 38 percent, respectively (Oluwakiyesi 2010). Dangote’s cement 
production operations have remained extremely profitable. In the 2012 and 2013 financial 
years, for instance, the company made a turnover of N286 billion and N372 billion and a 
profit before tax of N138 billion and N200 billion, respectively. These profits, which on 
average represented more than 50 percent of the turnover, were not liable to tax in Nigeria 
because of the company’s infant industry status.  
Unlike Dangote, multinational cement companies chose to proceed with caution. Although the 
political risks associated with doing business in Nigeria had greatly reduced with the 1999 
political transition, the ethical risks remain high. For “many companies, corruption remains 
                                                          
 
29
 This point was also reiterated by Suleiman Aliyu, Strategy Lead, Dangote plc, during our interview on 27 July 
2015.  
 
30
 See International Finance Corporation, Dangote Cement Plc Environmental Impact Assessment Summary, 
dated April 21 2005, downloaded from http://ifcext.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/ProjectDisplay/EIA23237> (27 
June 2014).   
 
31
 See table 2.  
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the biggest obstacle against investing in the oil-rich African nation.”32 Recently, for instance, 
the Dutch multinational firm Brunel closed its office in Nigeria. According to the company’s 
CEO, “it is impossible to do business [in Nigeria] without breaking the rules.” 
(DutchNews.NL, 26 August 2015). The risks faced by subsidiaries of multinationals in 
Nigeria are indeed real, especially given the growing spread of multilateral anti-bribery 
conventions. One of the most potent conventions is the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions 1997 (OECD Convention). The 39 countries who have 
thus far signed this Convention are responsible for two-thirds of world exports and three-
quarters of foreign investment (cf. OECD Convention 1997; D’Souza 2012). It is this growing 
international anti-bribery stance that has resulted in the recent huge fines paid by many 
multinational companies for paying bribes in Nigeria. Culprits include Haliburton, Technip, 
Snamprogetti and Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) (cf. New York Times, 10 March 2012; 
Financial Times, 27 November 2012). 
The reluctance of cement multinational companies to expand their operations in Nigeria has 
thus contributed to the emergence of Dangote Cement as the major beneficiary of the BIP.
33
 
Given that Nigeria is the home country of Dangote Cement, the company has little to fear 
with respect to possible sanctions against it for servicing the political and personal demands 
of Nigerian Government officials.  
The fact that Dangote was willing to go along with policies that could jeopardize bulk cement 
importation, in which he was the most important player, in favour of local manufacture of 
cement, at the time dominated by Lafarge SA, however, suggests that Dangote’s closeness to 
government was not the only factor at play. His entrepreneurial skills enabled him to properly 
understand the dynamics of the Nigerian cement industry and influenced the timing of his 
change of strategy from cement importation to cement manufacturing.
34
  
                                                          
32
 ‘Nigeria: Corruption scares off companies’, downloaded from <http://www.dw.com/en/nigeria-corruption-
scares-off-companies/a-18710146>  on 3 November 2015.   
 
33
 For a detailed analysis of the various types of risks multinational businesses face in Africa, please see Lem et 
al. (2013) and the World Bank and International Finance Corporation (2012).  
 
34 “Although the pace of our expansion is unprecedented in the cement industry, we are investing for growth at a 
time when many of the world's largest cement companies are focusing more upon debt reduction than capacity 
expansion, particularly in potentially high-growth regions like Africa. This is our strategic advantage. Our 
operational advantage in Africa is our ability to build modern, energy-efficient factories that will provide strong 
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Dangote’s entrepreneurial skills also influenced the company’s consistent drive to find ways 
of curtailing the cost of its power supply. In this regard, Dangote’s newer plants (Obajana and 
Ibese) use gas as their primary fuel. This is cheaper than the low-pour fuel oil (LPFO) that is 
used in the older Gboko plant, which is far away from the national gas infrastructure.
35
 In 
order to make the Gboko plant more competitive, it is now being restructured to use coal as 
the primary source of power. Because of the uncertainty surrounding gas supply and pricing 
in Nigeria, the Obajana and Ibese plants are currently being retooled so that they can also use 
coal, which is cheaper than LPFO (Dangote Cement Annual Report 2014). It is mainly a 
consequence of  its energy strategy that Dangote Cement has the lowest production costs 
amongst all the cement manufacturers in Nigeria (cf. Oluwakiyesi 2010; Dunn Loren 
Merrifield 2014). 
Another factor that has contributed to this African success story is the rapid increase in the 
demand for cement in the country in the recent past. As already mentioned, between 2000 
and 2014, the demand for cement in the country increased by over 400 percent. Such 
increases are also likely to continue in the future, not least because the current average per 
capita cement consumption in Africa of 92 kg still lags far behind the global average of 513 
kg (White 2015). The Dangote success story is essentially built on the back of the above 
demand. Dangote’s entrepreneurial skills enabled him to identify and exploit this 
opportunity. In its 2010 Annual Report, for instance, Dangote Cement analyzed the 
prospects for the demand for the product in the country thus: 
The improvement in oil production and the recovery in global crude oil prices have 
resulted in increased government revenue. Thus, it is expected that demand will continue 
to rise in the short to medium term on the back of increased infrastructure spending (2010 
budget of N4.6 trillion is 48% higher than the 2009 actual budget; while capital 
expenditure increased by 82% to N1.5 trillion). Another growth driver is the Central Bank 
of Nigeria’s recent initiative directed at providing about N500 billion for infrastructure 
projects in the electric power and real sectors of the economy. Growth is also expected to 
be very rapid if the government commences work towards actualizing its Vision 2020 
programme for housing and transportation, which according to industry sources estimates 
would consume about 919 million MT of cement over the next ten years. Considering the 
scale of the infrastructure deficit (deficit of 16 million homes with just 36 homes per 1,000 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
competition for many of Africa's ageing cement plants, producing higher quality, stronger and quicker-setting 
cement at lower cost” (Dangote Cement Annual Report 2014, p.13). 
 
35
 In order to ensure steady supply, Dangote constructed a 90 and 25 km gas pipeline for its Obajana and Ibese 
plants, respectively. It also entered into a 20-year gas purchase agreement with the Nigerian Gas Company 
(Scheme of Merger 2010, p.22). It has been noted that the “cost of LPFO per tonne of clinker produced is 
approximately 5x the cost of gas at Ibese and around 7x the cost of gas at Obajana” (Dangote Cement Annual 
Report 2012, p.17). 
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persons), the industry is confident of infrastructure investments driving demand growth for 
cement (Dangote 2010).  
Dangote Cement exploited such predictions to rapidly increase its cement production 
capacity in Nigeria from 8 million metric tonnes per annum (Dangote Cement Annual 
Report 2010) to the current 28.2 million metric tonnes. The result is that Dangote Cement 
currently controls 71.7 percent of the cement production capacity in Nigeria (table 2). The 
reluctance of cement multinationals to commit additional long-term capital to expand their 
cement production capacity in the country helped to reduce the risk of such long-term 
investments by Dangote Cement.  
The fact that Dangote Cement has been able to expand its cement production business 
across several African states, where its political influence is less certain, is also evidence 
that closeness to government is not the only explanation for the Dangote success story. In 
this direction, the company has either completed or is in the process of building cement 
production plants in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Republic of Congo, Liberia, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Ghana. The company is also building an 
import/packaging facility in Sierra Leone (see Dangote Cement 2014 Annual Report).  
Conclusion 
 
Few dispute the fact that the close relationship between Dangote and the Nigerian 
Government  has been a major contributory factor to the Dangote Cement success story. Even 
Obasanjo, whose policies contributed immensely to the Dangote Cement success, has not 
shied away from this fact. According to him, “if after 50 years of our cement business in 
Nigeria we could not get it right and under 5 years Dangote has gotten it, we have to support 
him” (Iliffe 2011). This paper has however argued that Dangote’s closeness to government is 
not the only explanatory variable for this remarkable success story. Dangote’s entrepreneurial 
skills and understanding of the Nigerian political and economic environment enabled him to 
appreciate the significance of Nigeria’s 1999 transition to civilian rule for both political 
stability and long-term business investments in Nigeria. It also enabled him to proactively 
project and exploit the rapid increase in cement demand in the country in the recent past. The 
reluctance of most multinational cement companies to increase their investments in Nigeria – 
a consequence of the ever increasing international scrutiny of business ethics, especially in 
corruption prone countries – have also helped reduce the competition and investment risks for 
Dangote Cement.  
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Table 1: Cement Statistics Nigeria 1986-2014 
 
Source: Cement Manufacturers Association of Nigeria  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Year Total Import (Mt) Local (Mt) Import % Local %
1986 4300000 800000 3500000 18,6 81,4
1987 4100000 700000 3400000 17,1 82,9
1988 4088341 688341 3400000 16,8 83,2
1989 3493621 543621 2950000 15,6 84,4
1990 3935595 905595 3030000 23 77
1991 4617272 1693200 2924072 36,7 63,3
1992 4782857 1985655 2797202 41,5 58,5
1993 4708044 2085826 2622218 44,3 55,7
1994 3479794 859886 2619908 24,7 75,3
1995 3701984 1091232 2610752 29,5 70,5
1996 3591298 1060300 2530998 29,5 70,5
1997 3821995 1304582 2517413 34,1 65,9
1998 4198943 1992588 2206355 47,5 52,5
1999 5584784 3112685 2472099 55,7 44,3
2000 5621640 3336134 2285506 59,3 40,7
2001 8105000 5937000 2168000 73,3 26,7
1002 8112000 6041000 2071000 74,5 25,5
2003 8418000 6437000 1981000 76,5 23,5
2004 8257000 5920000 2337000 71,7 28,3
2005 9478000 6629000 2049000 69,9 21,6
2006 9972722 6753000 3219722 67,7 32,3
2007 10969668 6327000 4642668 57,7 42,3
2008 13402880 6977000 6425880 52,1 47,9
2009 14674144 6719000 7955144 45,8 54,2
2010 14600000 5500000 9100000 37,7 62,3
2011 17200000 5200000 12000000 30,2 69,8
2012 18000000 1800000 16200000 10 90
2013 21300000 750000 20550000 3,5 96,5
2014 23000000 750000 22250000 3,3 96,7
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Table 2: Cement Plants in Nigeria as at June 2015 
 
Source: Cement Manufacturers Association of Nigeria  
  
S/N Companies Date commissioned Installed Capacity Sub Total %  of total Remarks 
MTPA MTPA 
1 Lafarge Africa 
Ewekoro 1 1960/2003 1.2 Lafarge Group
Ewekoro 2 2011 2.5 Lafarge Group
Sagamu 1978 1.0 Lafarge Group
Ashaka Cement 1979 0.8 5.50 14.0 Lafarge Group
2 Unicem 2009 2.50 2.50   6.4 Lafarge/ Flour Mills
3 Purechem Nigeria 2006 0.15 0.15   0.3 Mini Cement Plant
4 BUA Cement 
CCONN (Sokoto Cement) 1967 0.50 BUA
Edo Cement 2015 2.50 3.00   7.6 BUA
5 Dangote Cement Plc.
Benue Cement 1980/ 2004   3.00 Rehabilitated in 2004
Obajana Cement I 2006 10.20 Upgraded in 2012
Obajana Cement II 2014   3.00 Additional Expansion
Ibesse I 2012   6.00 Dangote
Ibesse II 2014   6.00 28.20 71.7 Dangote
Total 39.35 100
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